Hastings Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 1

Article 3

1-1992

The Golden State of Labor Preemption: The
Circuit Courts Have Gone too Far
Tod A. Cochran

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Tod A. Cochran, The Golden State of Labor Preemption: The Circuit Courts Have Gone too Far, 44 Hastings L.J. 131 (1992).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol44/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Notes

The Golden State of Labor Preemption:
The Circuit Courts Have Gone Too Far
by
TOD A. COCHRAN*

Introduction
The National Labor Relations Act1 (NLRA or Act) was originally
designed to protect workers' rights to unionize and to bargain collectively. The Act "aimed to end the repression of workers and to insure
their democratic rights."'2 Because the NLRA was intended to be comprehensive legislation, 3 it preempted the vast majority of state and local
labor laws.
The labor movement today, however, is in trouble. The percentage
of represented employees in the private sector, which peaked in 1954 at
38%, by 1989 had declined to a low of just 13.7%. 4 This is close to the
percentage that existed when the NLRA was adopted in 1935. 5
The NLRA has proved an insufficient mechanism to protect workers' interests. Its insufficiency is compounded further when the federal
law preempts local regulations beneficial to workers. This Note argues
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1982, Harvard College. The author wishes to thank
Marsha S. Berzon, Professor Joseph R. Grodin, Richard G. McCracken, and especially Indira
Talwani for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
2. Seth Kupferberg, PoliticalStrikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L.
REV. 685, 704 (1985) (citing 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of the NLRA's sponsor,
Sen. Wagner)).
3.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 27-30 (Charles J.Morris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983).

4. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 362 (1990) (citing Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1772
n.4 (1983) (1954 figure)); Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Labor, CURRENT WAGE
DEVS., Feb. 1990, at 4, 7 (percentage of private nonagricultural wage and salary workers represented by unions) (1989 figure). Public sector industry, on the other hand, had union membership levels at approximately 35% by the mid-1980s. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, New Data on Workers Belonging to Unions, 1986, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1987,

at 36.
5. Gottesman, supra note 4, at 362 (citing Weiler, supra note 4, at 1771).
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that federal preemption of state involvement in labor activity has gone
far enough. The Note defines the current reach of one branch of federal
preemption, as developed in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 6 argues that Golden State should mark the outer limit of labor
preemption, and identifies areas in which appellate courts have extended
Golden State preemption too far.
According to one authority in the field, Michael Gottesman, Congress never intended to preempt all local labor laws:
[T]he landscape today is totally different from that of the 1959-71 period in which the Court forged the NLRA preemption doctrines that
survive today. During that era, the Court viewed the NLRA positively, as succeeding in its objective .... [I]t saw the states as gener-

ally unsympathetic to promoting employee interests through law. The
state laws generating those preemption rulings most often were intended to restrict the assertion of collective employee power.

...[I]n [the present] era, in which the NLRA is not working for
the vast majority of America's employees,. . . state initiatives
may seek
7
to promote, rather than impede, collective bargaining.

Nevertheless, many beneficial state laws are in danger of being preempted. An example of state laws that have recently provided significant
benefits to workers is the law in several states concerning plant closures
and corporate takeovers. An overbroad preemption doctrine may eliminate many of these protections. One author argues that the mandatory
continuation of collective bargaining agreements in the aftermath of corporate takeovers should not be sanctioned as a matter of policy and that
the courts should preempt them.8 Another author observes that plant
relocation legislation that mandates bargaining may be preempted. 9 An
overzealous preemption doctrine may also supersede state statutes with
mandatory plant closure notice requirements.10
The threat of preemption to beneficial state laws was significantly
increased by the Supreme Court's decision in Golden State Transit Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles and the lower courts' interpretation of it. Until the
late 1980s, the Court's preemption doctrine restricted direct state intervention into either matters subject or "arguably subject to [the
NLRA], ' 11 or labor relations areas that Congress intended to be left to
6. 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
7. Gottesman, supra note 4, at 372-73 (footnote omitted).
8. Marcus P. Efthimiou, Note, State Legislative Attempts to Mandate Continuation of
Collective BargainingAgreements During Business Change: The Unfulfilled Expectations and
the Preempted Results, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 48 (1991).
9. Kyle B. Hettinger, Note, NLRA Preemption of State and Local Plant Relocation
Laws, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 407, 423 (1986).

10. Id.

11.

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959); see discussion

infra Part I.B. This strand of preemption is generally referred to as Garmon preemption.
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the "free play of economic forces." 12 In 1986, however, the Supreme
Court surprised many labor law observers with its decision in Golden
State, in which the Court prohibited the Los Angeles City Council from
assisting the local cab drivers' union in settling their strike. 13 This holding extended the preemption doctrine's reach to include state acts that
appear on their face largely unrelated to collective bargaining. While the
Golden State case itself was not wrongly decided, many subsequent decisions have taken Golden State off on the wrong track.
Courts that have addressed the preemption issue since Golden State
have misunderstood that decision and have interpreted its holding too
broadly. If workers are to be afforded any of the protections envisioned
by the drafters of the NLRA, then, given the Act's current ineffectiveness, local and state authorities must be allowed to offer some worker
protections without fear of additional preemptive rulings.
This Note provides a conceptual framework for understanding preemption under Golden State. The Note contends that Golden State must
mark the outer limit of preemption law, and argues that in too many
instances the lower courts have misapplied Golden State and impermissibly extended its boundaries. The Note proposes a three-part conceptual
framework to eliminate the confusion surrounding Golden State and to
ensure that future decisions conform to its boundaries. Part I briefly reviews the history of labor preemption leading up to Golden State, focusing on the two leading principles of NLRA preemption as announced by
the Supreme Court in Lodge 76, InternationalAss'n of Machinistsv. Wisconsin Relations Commission14 and San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon.15 Part II scrutinizes Golden State and articulates the three
main principles that form the conceptual framework. In brief, these
three principles are that governmental conduct is preempted if it constitutes direct intervention in the bargaining process, impermissibly "conditions" benefits on conforming labor relations behavior, or discourages a
party from exercising its NLRA-protected rights. Part III, using Golden
State's three-prong framework, analyzes the appellate cases correctly decided since that holding. Part IV criticizes the decisions of several circuits that misapply Golden State and impermissibly extend its
boundaries. This Note concludes that the misapplication of Golden State
has unfairly disadvantaged workers and their unions, and has left state
12. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)); see
discussion infra Part I.C. This strand of preemption is generally referred to as Machinists
preemption.
13. See 475 U.S. 608 (1986). This was followed in 1989 by Golden State Transit Corp. v.
City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), which addressed remedies for a labor preemption
violation. The unprecedented remedy holding in that case is beyond the scope of this Note.
14. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
15. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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and local officials unsure of what constitutes permissible conduct. The
Note proposes that the more principled analysis set forth in Part II be
applied by the courts in the future.
I.

Preemption in Perspective

The preemption doctrine arises from the conflict between federal
and state regulatory power. 16 The judiciary has responded to this federal-state tension by applying preemption, the supplantation of a state
law or regulatory act by federal legislation. 17 Congress has reserved exclusive power for the federal government in many enumerated areas, including labor relations. When the laws Congress devises in these areas
conflict with state laws, the preemption doctrine is applied, resolving the
conflict in favor of the federal law. Labor preemption, like all forms of
federal preemption, is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which declares that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."18
As discussed below, the NLRA carved out a large area of labor relations for its own jurisdiction. In the half century following the NLRA's
enactment, two dominant preemption principles, commonly referred to
as the Garmon and the Machinists doctrines, have arisen.' 9 More reof Machinists in MetropolitanLife
cently, the Court affirmed a limitation
20
Massachusetts.
v.
Insurance Co.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
Section 1 of the NLRA states that the congressional purpose of the
Act is "to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association ... for the purpose of negotiating. ' 21 The Act
also created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which in16. William Bratton, Jr., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectiveson Federalism and The Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1975).
17. This should be distinguished from Commerce Clause preemption, which invalidates a
state law through a clause in the U.S. Constitution. Mary Lee A. Howarth, Preemption and
Punitive Damages: The Conflict Continues Under FIFRA, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1301, 1301 &
n.5 (1988) (citing Bratton, supra note 16, at 623 n.7).
18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at
1505-06.
19. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1504-05. There is a third preemption principle derived from section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act that provides that
the federal courts have jurisdiction in "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988). Section 301 preemption is beyond the
scope of this Note.
20. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 151(1) (1988).
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cludes among its functions the jurisdiction over representation questions,
22
and the investigation and adjudication of unfair labor practices.
Two of the most important sections of the Act are sections 7 and 8.
Section 7 establishes the right of employees to "self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively... , and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining."' 23 Section 8 prohibits labor practices that interfere with or restrain the right to "self-organization. '24 Section 8(d) defines collective
bargaining and provides that parties are required to bargain in good faith
but are not compelled to reach agreement. 25 Taken as a whole, the Act
was designed to provide a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to protect
26
employees' labor relations interests.
B. The Garnon Doctrine
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon27 is the seminal case
involving modem labor preemption doctrine. The Garmon Court
adopted a broad view of labor preemption when it ruled that a state court
lacked jurisdiction under state law to award tort damages to an employer
for loss of business caused by union picketing. The NLRB had declined
jurisdiction, presumably because the amount of business in interstate
28
commerce did not meet the Board's minimum jurisdictional standards.
Despite the Board's refusal to take the case, the Supreme Court held that
state court jurisdiction was preempted.
Garmon's importance derives from the general rules that the Court
laid out to govern labor preemption:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which
a State purports to regulate are protected by section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield ....
... When an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8
of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if29the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.
Garmon created an expansive preemption doctrine that granted the
NLRB the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the full array of labor activities either prohibited or arguably prohibited or protected by the Act. In
22.
23.
24.
25.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 28.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).

26.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,

27.

359 U.S. 236 (1959).

28. Id. at 238.
29.

Id. at 244-45.

supra note 3, at 27-28.
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applying the Garmon principles in subsequent cases, 30 the Supreme
Court has held that because of potential NLRA conflict, states may not,
for example, enjoin peaceful picketing, 31 deny unemployment compensation to persons filing NLRB charges, 32 regulate or prohibit strikes
deemed contrary to public interest, 33 or award damages against a union
34
for wrongful discharge under a union security agreement.
A recent example of the Garmon doctrine, decided during the same
term as Golden State, appears in the Court's decision in Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc. 35 Gould
involved a challenge to a statute mandating that the Wisconsin labor
agency maintain a list of every person or firm determined to have committed three separate violations of the NLRA in three separate cases
within a five year period. 36 Pursuant to the statute, the state was forbidden to purchase products from any of the violating manufacturers. 37 The
unanimous Court relied directly on Garmon in asserting that "the Garmon rule prevents states not only from setting forth standards of conduct
inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the NLRA, but also
from providing their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct
'38
prohibited or arguably prohibited by the Act."
Despite Garmon's sweeping scope, the decision established two instances in which preemption would not apply. These are conventionally
referred to as the twin exceptions of "local concerns" and "peripheral
matters." The Garmon Court reasoned that there is some conduct by the
parties in a labor relations context that "touche[s] interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that ...[the Court] could not
infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act."' 39 The
classic examples of excepted conduct touching interests "deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility" are in the areas of trespass and picketline violence: "mass picketing which obstructs streets and plant entrances, or involves violence and threats of violence, is subject to injunctive relief by a state tribunal."''4
The Court also carved out an exception for labor conduct of only
"peripheral" concern to the NLRA. The idea was to allow state inter30. For discussion of the labor preemption cases following Garmon, see Lee Modjeska,
Federalism in Labor Relations, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 487, 490-91 (1989).
31. Haltiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
32. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
33. Amalgamated Ass'n of State Employees, Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
34. Amalgamated Ass'n of State Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
35. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
36. Id. at 283 & n.1.
37. Id. at 283-84; see David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine: Hamiltonian
Renaissance or Last Hurrah?,27 WM.& MARY L. REV. 507, 573-74 (1986).
38. Gould, 475 U.S. at 286.
39. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 (citation omitted).
40.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1531.
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vention in relatively unrelated matters. This supplemented the local concerns exception: "[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing
federal system .. has required us not to find withdrawal from the States
of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral
concern of the... Act."' 4 1 The frequently cited example of this exception
is internal union affairs, such as the imposition of fines on members. 42
C. The Machinists Doctrine
In Lodge 76, InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,4 3 the Court "expanded the parameters of
Garmon to encompass conduct.., intended by Congress to be left unregulated so that it may be 'controlled by the free play of economic
forces.' "44 This concept of an unregulated zone of conduct provided the
foundation for the Golden State decision ten years later.
Machinistsinvolved employees who jointly refused to work overtime
in order to pressure their employer to renew their contract. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission noted that this activity, a "partial" strike, was neither prohibited nor protected by section 7 or section 8
of the Act because it was not a "full" strike. Accordingly, the Employ45
ment Relations Commission enjoined the employees' refusal to work.
In overturning the Commission's injunction, the Supreme Court
held:
[A] particular activity might be "protected" by federal law not only
when it fell within § 7, but also when it was an activity that Congress
intended to be "unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate"
because it was among the permissible "economic weapons in reserve,
... actual exercise [of which] on occasion by the parties,
'46 is part and
parcel of the system that the [NLRA has] recognized."
The Machinists Court reasoned that when Congress carefully crafted a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that balanced power between workers
and management, it intended to leave to the parties the freedom to use
self-help weapons without restriction. 47 Wisconsin's action was preof the bargaining
empted since it entered "into the substantive aspects '48
process to an extent Congress has not countenanced.
41.

Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243.

42.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1538.

43.

427 U.S. 132 (1976).

44.

THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1523 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-

Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
45. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 136.
46. Id. at 141 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960) (first two
alterations by court)).
47. Id. at 146-47.
48. Id. at 149 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960)).
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The Metropolitan Life Limitation

Not all state acts that have an impact on bargaining matters are per
se impermissible interference in the "balance of power," however. The
courts have generally allowed local government to dictate substantive employment terms applicable to all employees, union and non-union alike.
As the Supreme Court concluded in MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.
v. Massachusetts4 9 decided one term prior to Golden State, Congress did
not intend to preclude the states from establishing minimum standards
for substantive employment terms.5 0 The MetropolitanLife decision thus
limits Machinists preemption to procedural matters only: "Metropolitan
Life has been understood to... limit Machinists... to the preemption of
state laws regulating the processes of collective bargaining, rather than
'5 1
mandating the substantive terms of agreement."
The governmental act in question in Metropolitan Life was a state
statute mandating minimum mental health coverage for all employees
insured under a general health insurance policy. 5 2 Other examples of
areas in which the Court has held that states may regulate include minimum wages, unemployment and workers compensation, holidays, child
labor, and severance pay for plant closures.5 3 Although these state laws
may have a substantive impact on the terms of collective bargaining
agreements, they affect
all union and nonunion employees equally and
54
are not preempted.
Archibald Cox, although writing before Metropolitan Life and Machinist were decided, offered a useful analysis of the minimum labor standards limitation. Professor Cox called for a presumption that state laws
that apply equally to unionized and nonunionized workers do not upset
49.
50.
51.

471 U.S. 724 (1985).

Id. at 748-49.
Michael C. Harper, Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy,
Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 725-27 (1990).
52. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 727.
53. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987). In Fort Halifax, the
Supreme Court addressed a Maine statute that required employers to provide a one-time severance payment in the event of a plant closing. The statute did not apply to employees covered
by a collective bargaining agreement with a severance provision. Id. at 3, 5-6 & nn.2-3. The
plaintiff attacked this ordinance as potentially affecting the bargaining relationship by providing the union with a powerful fallback position in case it could not achieve a preferable severance deal. The Court noted, "[ijt is true that the Maine statute gives employees something for
which they otherwise might have to bargain." Id. at 21. Nonetheless, the Court dismissed any
suggestion of preemption: "[T]he Maine law is not pre-empted by the NLRA, since it establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon the collective-bargaining process." Id. at 7. As summarized by one labor law text: "Because 'the NLRA is concerned with
ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms ... from such bargaining,' Maine was free to act." THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 657 (quoting Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 20) (omission in original).
54. Modjeska, supra note 30, at 507.
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the federal labor scheme. But where a state act is directed at an individual bargaining relationship, or at an aspect of labor relations traditionally
reserved for unions, the NLRA should have jurisdiction and preemption
should usually be applied."5
In sum, in Garmon and Machinists, the Court carved out two general areas of labor relations that are to remain immune from local regulation: any conduct by the parties that is either arguably prohibited or
protected by the NLRA (subject to the twin exceptions of local concerns
and peripheral matters), and any conduct that lies within the free play of
economic forces. Additionally, Metropolitan Life spells out a limitation
that allows for state regulation that universally affects employees' substantive bargaining terms.
II. The Golden State of Labor Preemption
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court in 1986 revisited labor
preemption in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles.5 6 In
October 1980, a group of Los Angeles taxi drivers represented by the
Teamsters Union was unable to negotiate a renewal of its contract with
the city's largest cab company, Golden State Transit. At the same time,
Golden State was attempting to renew its taxicab franchise with the City
of Los Angeles, which was to expire on March 31, 1981. The city's
Board of Transportation Commissioners recommended renewal to the
Los Angeles City Council. While the franchise application was pending,
the contract between the drivers and Golden State expired and both sides
signed a short-term agreement to continue operations while mediation
and negotiations continued.57 The interim agreement expired on February 10, 1981, one day before the Council was scheduled to consider
franchise renewals. The drivers went on strike on February 11. Based
on testimony from Teamster representatives, the Council became concerned about the strike and postponed consideration of the renewal until
its March 23 meeting. After discussing the strike at the March 23 meeting, the Council decided not to renew the franchise unless Golden State
successfully settled its union dispute within the next week.5 8 When the
55. Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337, 1355-56
(1972).
56. 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
57. Id. at 609-10.
58. Id. at 610-11. The Los Angeles City Council argued that in deciding whether to
renew the franchise it was not acting like a labor regulator, but rather was exercising a historical municipal role and was thus immune from preemption. Id. at 617-18. The Court, drawing
on a decision from the same term, Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986), rejected the distinction. Golden State, 475 U.S. at
618. In Gould, which was concerned with state spending decisions, the Court had similarly
rejected the appellant's attempt to make a distinction based on the Commerce Clause between
market regulator and participant. Gould, 475 U.S. at 287.
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company failed to do so, the Council allowed the franchise to expire on
March 31 without renewal. 59
Golden State then filed an action in federal district court alleging the
city's action was preempted under Machinists. Although the district
court ruled in favor of the taxicab company, 6° the Ninth Circuit disagreed, asserting that the action fell within the peripheral matters exception of Garmon and thus was not subject to preemption. 61 The Supreme
Court reversed and held that the Council's nonrenewal of the franchise
62
was preempted.
Three years after rendering its decision, the Court revisited the case
in Golden State 11.63 On remand to determine remedies, the district
court had granted an injunction, but declined to grant compensatory relief under Golden State's theory of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation. 64 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of § 1983 compensatory
damages, 65 but the Supreme Court reversed. 66 Golden State 11 is an important remedies holding because of its novel application of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.67 Although prior preemption decisions offered equitable remedies, Golden State I was the first decision to grant monetary relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.68 Nevertheless, Golden State I is of more direct significance in determining permissible labor relations conduct.
Golden State was a landmark preemption decision because it extended the Machinists doctrine into uncharted territory. Unfortunately,
by venturing into uncharted territory, Golden State merely added to the
confusion surrounding the doctrine of labor preemption. As one author
commented, "[n]o legal issue in the field of collective bargaining has been
59. Golden State, 475 U.S. at 611.
60. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 520 F. Supp. 191 (C.D. Cal.
1981), rev'd, 754 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
61. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev'd, 475 U.S. 608 (1986). The Supreme Court did not address the twin exceptions, stating
that "We do not reach the question whether the city's action in this case is preempted under
Garmon, because Golden State and its supporting amici... rely exclusively on the Machinists
doctrine, and we find their argument persuasive." Golden State, 475 U.S. at 614 n.4. Thus the
door was left open as to whether the Garmon exceptions would ever apply in a Machinists or
Golden State analysis. Modjeska, supra note 30, at 98.
62.

Golden State, 475 U.S. at 618.

63. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
64. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F. Supp. 571, 578 (C.D. Cal.
1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
65. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 857 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
66. Golden State, 493 U.S. 103.
67. Henry P. Monaghan, FederalStatutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 233, 246 (1991).
68. Id. The holding of Golden State II is significant to local agencies considering conduct
that may be construed as preempted. Golden State 11 and its discussion of remedies is, however, beyond the scope of this Note.
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presented to the Supreme Court more frequently in the past thirty years
than that of the preemption of state law, and perhaps no other legal issue
has been left in quite as much confusion. '69 The bewilderment has continued, as shown by the numerous circuit court misinterpretations of
Golden State doctrine discussed below. 70
This confusion may be eliminated, however, by breaking down
Golden State into its essential parts. Golden State establishes three different principles. Governmental conduct is preempted if it:
(1) Constitutes direct intervention in the bargaining process (except
that state establishment of minimum labor standards is not
preempted);
(2) "conditions" benefits on conforming labor relations behavior; or
(3) discourages a party from exercising its NLRA-protected rights.
These principles are discussed below.
A.

Direct Intervention in the Bargaining Process

The first Golden State preemption principle involves intervention in
the bargaining process. The Supreme Court determined that the Los Angeles City Council directly intervened in the bargaining process when it
allowed the taxicab company's franchise to expire as a result of the company's dispute with its drivers. 71 If the bargaining relationship is viewed
as two parties competing on opposite sides of a delicately balanced scale,
then the Council's intrusion may be viewed as the equivalent of knocking
over the whole apparatus.
Of the three Golden State principles outlined above, this most
closely follows earlier preemption precedents. The Court's decision was
a relatively straightforward application of "the second preemption principle, the so-called Machinists preemption .... This precludes state and
municipal regulation 'concerning conduct that Congress intended to be
unregulated.' "72 The city's decision not to renew the franchise, based in
part on the labor dispute, thrust it into the middle of the conflict in that
the city acted like a party at the bargaining table, holding a hammer over
the company's head: "The city's insistence on a settlement is preempted
if the city '[entered] into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process
to an extent Congress has not countenanced.' 173 This aspect of the
Golden State decision also adheres to the Metropolitan Life minimum
69.

ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 895 (10th ed.

1986).
70. See infra Part IV.
71. Golden State, 475 U.S. at 615.
72. Id. at 614 (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749

(1985)).
73. Id. at 616 (quoting Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 149 (1976)).
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standards principle since the Council's conduct was not universal, but
instead was directed at a particular taxicab company embroiled in a labor
dispute.
A counterexample of non-preemptive action illustrates how the
city's action impermissibly intruded into the process: Instead of intervening directly in the bargaining process, the city might have inquired as
to what the union drivers needed to settle their dispute. For example, the
union might have insisted on cars equipped with driver's side air bags.
The city might then have mandated that thenceforth any transportationrelated employers seeking municipal contracts or franchises would have
to provide vehicles equipped with air bags. Even though this mandate
would effectively settle the taxicab dispute, it would avoid preemption;
the Council, like the state agency in Metropolitan Life, would be establishing a universal minimum standard, rather than intervening in a particular dispute.
B. Conditioning of Franchise Renewal
The second preemption principle established in Golden State is that
the Council's action must not be conditioned, or contingent, on the labor
dispute: "We hold, therefore, that the city was preempted from conditioning Golden State's franchise renewal on the settlement of the labor
dispute."' 74 This is the most novel of the three Golden State principles.
First, prior preemption holdings concerned state behavior expressly directed toward labor relations activity. Second, the Court had never
before prohibited the "conditioning" of governmental benefits on con75
forming behavior.
Previously, the Court had concerned itself with state acts that on
their face addressed employer-employee relations. In Garmon,76 the
Court proscribed an award of damages for peaceful organizational pick74. Id. at 618; see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103,
104 (1989).
75. In Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475
U.S. 282 (1986), however, the Court did address, and declare preempted, a somewhat similar
form of "conditioning." See infra text accompanying notes 35-38. In a sense the State of
Wisconsin "conditioned" its purchasing of products on those businesses not repeatedly violating the NLRA. The condition in Gould is distinguishable, however, because it is a universal
regulation applied to all purchasers, Gould, 475 U.S. at 283-84, as opposed to the Los Angeles
City Council's franchise withholding, which specifically targeted the taxicab company. As a
regulation, the Wisconsin statute "interfere[s] with Congress' 'integrated scheme of regulation'
by adding a remedy to those prescribed by the NLRA." Id. at 287 (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). Furthermore, the Wisconsin statute
differs because it punishes improper behavior rather than directly encouraging conforming
conduct. Id.
76. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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eting, 77 and in Machinists,78 a state labor board was prohibited from
bringing an unfair labor practice charge against union members' concerted refusal to work overtime. 79 Franchise nonrenewal, on the other
hand, appears on its face to be unrelated to labor relations. The Golden
State Court dismissed the city's objection to the novelty of the Court's
preemption application by noting that the type of intervention was not
determinative of the Court's analysis. To justify its innovation, however,
the Court quoted Garmon: "'[J]udicial concern has necessarily focused
on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate,
rather than on the method of regulation adopted.' "so However, Garmon
provides little authority for an innovative method of regulation since in
that case the governmental intervention was in the well-established form
of state court damages for labor relations activity.8 1
Another innovation was the Court's focus on the city's "conditioning" as grounds for preemption. In Garmon and Machinists, the preempted state conduct was a direct form of intervention. Conditioning is,
by its nature, indirect. According to the Golden State Court, when the
Council used its control over the franchise renewal process to force settlement, it entered forbidden territory: "Our holding does not require a
city to renew or to refuse to renew any particular franchise. We hold
in a way that inonly that a city cannot condition a franchise 8renewal
2
trudes into the collective-bargaining process."
There are two important aspects of an impermissible condition.
First, only actions are held preempted. The Court did not intimate, nor
could it, that mere public statements or resolutions would be invalid
since statements merely evince an opinion of the state entity. Actions
like franchise nonrenewal have the power to force affected parties to respond. The city had a right to be concerned about the dispute and could
have suggested to the parties, without fear of preemption, the use of arbitration or fact-finding to settle their differences.
Second, there must be a nexus between the governmental conduct
and the labor dispute. If, at the time of the strike, the Los Angeles City
Council had required the cab company to purchase new tires and brakes
as part of a safety program, this mandate would not be preempted since it
would not have been tied directly to conforming behavior, even if the
Council had been privately motivated by its dissatisfaction over the
77.

Id. at 237, 248; see discussion supra Part I.B.

78. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
79. Id. at 155; see discussion supra Part I.C.
80. 475 U.S. at 614 n.5 (quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243) (alteration in original).
81.

See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237-38.

82.

Golden State, 475 U.S. at 619.
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strike. 8 3 However, to condition its franchise renewal on the outcome of
the labor dispute was impermissible.
C.

Discouragement of the Exercise of NLRA-Protected Rights

The third principle that Golden State added to the preemption doctrine is that local government may not discourage a party's exercise of its
NLRA-protected rights. If direct intervention constitutes knocking over
the carefully balanced scale of negotiations, discouraging the exercise of
NLRA-protected rights may be viewed as the state shifting the balance in
favor of one side or the other.
This third principle is an extension of existing concepts in labor law
and preemption. Garmon and Machinists teach that conflict between
NLRA-protected activity and state interference with that activity leads
to preemption of the state involvement. Additionally, section 8 of the
NLRA expressly forbids employer activity that discourages employees
from exercising their protected rights. Golden State combined these two
concepts and forbade a state actor, the Los Angeles City Council, from
discouraging a party from exercising its rights. When the Council
threatened to and subsequently did withhold Golden State's franchise, it
effectively imposed a time limit on the bargaining process. The time limit
was imposed by the Council's declaration that the dispute must end
before it would grant a franchise. This imposition of a time limit discouraged Golden State from exercising its right to outlast the union and
not to reach an agreement pursuant to Section 8(d) of the Act: 84 "The
NLRA requires an employer and a union to bargain in good faith, but it
does not require them to reach an agreement. § 8(d) . . . [the] duty to
bargain in good faith 'does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession.' -85 Golden State was thus discouraged from exercising its right to use its economic weapon of withstanding strikes and outlasting the union. This type of discouragement is
86
impermissible.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Golden State extended the boundaries
of Machinists-type labor preemption to encompass three principles. The
first principle, the prohibition of direct intervention in the bargaining
process, borrows heavily from Machinists. However, the second principle, the prohibition of conditioning a governmental benefit on conforming labor relations behavior, is completely innovative. The third
principle, that state actions may not discourage a party from exercising
its rights, is a novel combination of previously existing concepts.
83. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); International
Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 928 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1991); see also discussion supra Part I.D.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
85. 475 U.S. at 616 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)).
86. Id.
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Ill. The Circuit Courts' Correct Applications of Golden State
This Note next examines the appellate cases decided since Golden
State that correctly apply that holding. As an organizing principle, this
Note uses the three-prong framework discussed in Part II.
A. Interference with the Terms of Bargaining Is Not Preempted if Applied
Universally
The first Golden State principle, that direct interference with the
bargaining process is prohibited, recognizes that states may enact universally applied substantive labor standards. The Second Circuit has correctly applied this universal standards principle to prevailing wage scales.
87
In GeneralElectric Co. v. New York State Department of Labor,
the Second Circuit addressed a New York State wage law that provided
that the wage rate on public works contracts shall not be less than the
prevailing rate paid locally to the majority of workers in the same trade
or occupation.8 8 A group of General Electric (GE) workers were performing transformer maintenance and repair for the Long Island Railroad in various New York counties. The New York Commissioner of
Labor found that the benefits and wages paid these workers by GE were,
in some cases, less than the wages required by the statute.89 The Commissioner computed what he deemed would be GE's cost of providing
wages if paid at prevailing local rates. He then notified the railroad to
withhold the amount GE owed the employees, as well as interest and
penalties, from the railroad's payments to GE.90
GE argued that the New York statute was preempted by the
NLRA. It asserted that "a prevailing wage statute.., does not establish
minimum labor standards, because: 'a prevailing wage is in the nature of
91
an average wage ... which varies from year to year ....
The Second Circuit disagreed with General Electric's position and
correctly held that the New York statute was not preempted. 92 Citing
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, the court accurately
identified the statute as a minimum labor standard affecting union and
nonunion workers equally rather than as a violation of Golden State's
prohibition against "'government step[ping] in and becom[ing] a party
to the negotiations.' ,,93
87. 891 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990).
88. Id. at 26.
89. Id. at 26, 27.
90. Id. at 26-27.
91. General Electric Co. v. New York State Dep't. of Labor, 698 F. Supp. 1093, 1098
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting GE's reply brief) (emphasis omitted), vacated, 891 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 (1990).
92. GeneralElectric, 891 F.2d at 27.
93. Id. at 28 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608,
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Governmental Acts Must Not Be Conditioned on Conforming Labor
Relations Behavior

Golden State's second principle is that the Council's franchise renewal must not be "conditioned" on the labor dispute. One important
aspect of an impermissible condition is the nexus between governmental
conduct and the labor dispute. A local government may, without fear of
preemption, act in a way that coincidentally affects one of the parties
during the pendency of their labor dispute. 94 Mere coincidence of time
does not signify a connection between the government's act and the labor
conflict.
The First Circuit correctly applied this principle to an environmental ordinance that affected a business involved in a local labor dispute. In
InternationalPaperCo. v. Town of Jay,95 1200 organized factory workers
in Jay, Maine went on strike to enforce their contract with International
Paper. The company promptly replaced them. There was a sufficient
number of workers serving on the Jay Board of Selectmen, however, to
create a majority. 96 Subsequent to the work stoppage, the Board drafted
and passed the Jay Environmental Control and Improvement Ordinance,
an elaborate regulatory scheme mandating that local businesses obtain a
permit before discharging pollutants. 97 International Paper argued that
the ordinance was an impermissible interference with the "free play of
economic forces" between the parties and thus was preempted under
9
Golden State. 8
The First Circuit, finding no nexus between the Board's environmental ordinance and the paper company's labor dispute, disagreed and
correctly held the ordinance valid. In dismissing International Paper's
claim of preemption, the court stated: "[A]ctions which regulate activity
...without placing conditions on the conduct of the parties to the dispute, are not subject to preemption." 99 The court pointed out that in
"Golden State, the City Council expressly conditioned the employer's
franchise renewal on the settlement of the labor dispute.... [T]he City's
placement of conditions on renewal of the employer's operating franchise
forced its hand in the dispute."' °
619 (1986)). Ultimately, the General Electric court overturned the lower court because it accepted GE's argument that the statutory provisions applicable to the case were preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Id. at 30.
94. International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 928 F.2d 480, 484 (lst Cir. 1991).
95.

Id.

96.

The Jay Board of Selectmen is the governing body for the Town of Jay.

97.

InternationalPaper, 928 F.2d at 481-82.

98. Id. at 483 (quoting Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)).
99. Id. at 484.
100. Id. "[I]t remains the law that actions which regulate activity only peripherally related to labor policy ...

are not subject to preemption." Id.
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The motive for the strict environmental ordinance may well have
been inextricably linked to the former mill workers' animus toward the
company, given the timing of the ordinance and dispute; the ordinance
was initially passed less than two months after the strikers were replaced,
and would clearly apply to International Paper. 10 1 The First Circuit
stated, however, that motive was not relevant: "We are unwilling to construe Golden State so broadly as to require inquiry, on the facts of this
case, into the motives of the selectmen prior to the Board's drafting and
10 2
proposing the Ordinance."'
C. Governmental Acts That Discourage a Party from Exercising Its NLRAProtected Rights Are Preempted
The third principle established by Golden State is that governmental
conduct that discourages the exercise of NLRA-protected rights is preempted. Discouragement may be viewed as the state favoring one side of
the balance of bargaining power. The Los Angeles City Council favored
the employees' side when it discouraged Golden State from exercising its
rights under section 8(d) of the NLRA by withholding the company's
03
franchise renewal.1
An Eighth Circuit case, United Steelworkers of America v. Johnson, 104 correctly applied this third Golden State principle. The Johnson
court addressed a preemption challenge to a South Dakota statute that
denied unemployment benefits to striking workers unless they were nonunion members.' 0 5 The employer, Homestake Mining Company, had
closed down all operations at their mine, effectively putting out of work
both union and nonunion workers.' 0 6 The South Dakota Department of
Labor implemented an exception to the unemployment statute allowing
benefits for workers involved in a labor dispute as long as those workers
were "locked out" by their employer. The Department of Labor reasoned this exception applied to nonunion workers alone since they were
available to work but prevented from working by their employer. 0 7 As a
result of South Dakota's application of their unemployment statute,
101. Id. at 482.
102. Id. at 483-84; see discussion supra Part II. The Golden State Court discounted the
relevance of motive: "But the question is not whether the city's action favors one side or the
other. Our holding does not require a city to renew or to refuse to renew any particular
franchise. We hold only that a city cannot... intruded into the collective-bargaining process." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 619 (1986).
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
104. 799 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1986), afftd on reh'g en banc, 830 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1987).
105. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Johnson, 830 F.2d 924, 925 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
106. Johnson, 799 F.2d at 403.
107. Id. at 404.
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many union members quit their membership to take advantage of the
08
state benefits.1
The court appropriately concluded that the statute was preempted
because it discouraged workers from remaining in the union, thereby intruding on their most fundamental NLRA-protected right: 0 9 "[T]he
Union, here, is able to point to tangible injury in the form of attempts at
resignation by its union members in order to establish eligibility for unemployment [benefits]." ' 10 The Johnson court also recognized that the
statute discouraged the employees from exercising their right to strike:
"[Iln a subtle but pernicious sense, the differentiation between union and
non-union members works to impermissibly strengthen the hand of management" because the certainty of uneven compensation between strikers
and nonstrikers will cause workers to vote against a strike."'
The Eighth Circuit also recognized that South Dakota's application
of this statute discriminated against union members. The court applied
an equal protection analysis and, while recognizing that the statute was
neutral on its face, noted:
In the circumstances of this case, however, South Dakota has failed to
apply this test in a neutral, nondiscriminatory manner.
The record shows that in determining a union worker's eligibility
for benefits South Dakota focused on whether the claimant belonged to
the Union.
The disparate treatment of union workers who may otherwise satburdens the section 7 right to
isfy the eligibility standard significantly
2
participate in organized labor."
IV.

Misapplications of Golden State: Some Circuit Courts
Have Gone Too Far

In many cases since Golden State, the circuit courts have misunderstood the Supreme Court's holding and inappropriately extended the
boundaries of preemption. Owing to the confusion surrounding Golden
State, these courts have preempted governmental conduct that should
have been allowed,1 3 and permitted conduct that should have been preempted. 1 4 As a result, workers are denied the benefit of state acts that
are designed to help them.
108. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 925-26.
109. Id. at 929.
110. Johnson, 799 F.2d at 404.
111. Id. at 409.
112. Johnson, 830 F.2d at 928-29 (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991); Associated
Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 935 F.2d 345 (lst Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d
353 (4th Cir. 1991); Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1988).
114. See, e.g., Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1991); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.
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Preemption Resulting from Erroneous Application of the Prohibition of
Direct Interference with Bargaining

The Golden State doctrine reaffirmed the Machinists principle that
direct interference with the bargaining process is preempted. When the
Los Angeles City Council postponed its decision on Golden State's
franchise and then allowed it to expire because of the company's dispute
with the drivers, it intervened directly in the bargaining process.115
16
A Fourth Circuit case, Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton,'
however, incorrectly applied the direct interference principle of Golden
State. In 1989, coal miner members of the United Mine Workers of
America struck the Pittston Coal Mine, formed picket lines along the
11 7
company's own bridge, and used violence to halt equipment trucks.
The West Virginia police, interpreting two state statutes that mandated
both "neutrality" and nonenforcement of trespassing laws1 1in
labor dis8
putes, took a hands-off approach to the picketers' activity.
The Rum Creek company requested a declaratory order that the
two state statutes were unconstitutional and a permanent injunction
preventing the police from enforcing or in effect relying on the statutes.11 9 The company contended that the police department's interpretation of these state statutes caused them to treat striking workers
differently (more favorably) than other citizens and that the inaction of
the police should therefore be preempted under Golden State because it
constituted an impermissible intrusion into both parties' use of economic

weapons. 120
The Fourth Circuit, while "recogniz[ing] that the connection between the state's trespass statute and the company's ability to withstand
v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 824 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 989

(1988).
115. See discussion supra Part II.
116. 926 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1991). This case was revisited in Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc.
v. Caperton, 971 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1992).
117. Rum Creek, 926 F.2d at 356.
118. Id. at 356-57. The Neutrality Clause of the West Virginia Code reads that "no officer
or member of the Department of Public Safety may, in any labor trouble or dispute between
employer and employee, aid or assist either party thereto, but shall in such cases see that the
statutes and laws of this State are enforced in a legal way and manner." W. VA. CODE § 15-213 (1984).
The" 'Trespass Statute' makes a trespasser criminally liable for knowingly entering property without permission and contrary to notice, defying an order to leave, causing damage
while trespassing, or being armed with a weapon and intending to cause bodily harm while
trespassing. The Trespass Statute, however, provides an exception indicating that its provi-

sions do not apply 'in a labor dispute.'" Rum Creek, 971 F.2d at 1150 (quoting W. VA. CODE
§ 61-3B-3 (1984)).
119. Rum Creek, 926 F.2d at 354.
120. Id. at 365-66.
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a strike is not as direct as in the Golden State cases,"' 12 1 nonetheless erroneously held that the decision by the police not to intervene in the strike
was preempted.
This was an improper application of the first principle of Golden
State which prohibits interference with the process of bargaining.
Whereas the Los Angeles City Council in Golden State interfered with
the taxicab company's bargaining dispute by imposing a time limit, the
police in Rum Creek actually abstained from interfering with the coal
miner's dispute by taking a hands-off approach to the picket line activities. 2 2 The Fourth Circuit mistakenly accepted the company's contention that when the police abstained from acting because they believed
their actions would be preempted, their abstention was itself preempted
23
as governmental interference with the bargaining process.
The court's argument constitutes circular reasoning. When the police refrained from interfering with the bargaining dispute, they avoided
intervention in the "free play of economic forces."' 124 Thus, the abstention by the police should not have been preempted. Instead, the Fourth
Circuit should have accepted the abstention by the police as a correct
interpretation of the state's proper role in a labor dispute-to stay out of
it.
B.

Preemption Resulting from Failure to Recognize the Metropolitan Life
Allowance for Universal Minimum Labor Standards

Several circuit courts have failed to understand that universally applied minimum employment standards should not be preempted under a
Golden State analysis. In one Ninth Circuit case, Barnes v. Stone
Container Corp.,'1 25 the court erroneously held that implied contract
terms are preempted because they discourage employees from bargaining. Mr. Barnes, a seven-year employee of a Montana paper mill,
worked under a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement expired
in May 1987 and the company, fearing a strike, hired replacement workers in advance. Mr. Barnes, in the course of picket line activities,
squirted two of the employees with a water hose, and was subsequently
126
fired for harassment of his co-workers.
The union filed an unfair labor practice claim alleging that the employer fired Barnes in retaliation for exercising his NLRA-protected section 7 rights. The NLRB found no basis for the claim, and the union
121.
122.

Id. at 365.
Id. at 357.

123.

Id. at 365-66.

124.
125.
126.

See discussion supra Part I.C.
942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 690.
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withdrew it.127 Mr. Barnes subsequently brought a claim under the
Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDA), which
requires good cause for all terminations. 128 The employer erroneously
argued that the WDA was preempted under Machinistsand Golden State
since it implied a contract term. The employer argued that when a contract term that has not been bargained for is effectively mandated by the
legislature, employees have no incentive to exercise their right to bargain
29
for that particular contract term since it is already required by law.1
The Ninth Circuit, incorrectly applying the third Golden State principle,
agreed with the employer. The court concluded that the problem with
an implied term is that it "would have the untoward effect of imposing130a
contract term on the parties and thus altering incentives to negotiate.'
The factual circumstances of Golden State, however, are distinguishable
from those of Barnes. The Los Angeles City Council's franchise nonrenewal was directed towards an individual bargaining dispute in that it
discouraged the taxicab company from withstanding the strike. The
Montana WDA, by contrast, applied universally to all workers.
Since the Barnes court confronted a universally applicable statute,
the Metropolitan Life limitation to the first Golden State principle, allowing state acts that establish universal minimal labor standards, should
have been applied. The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Metropolitan Life:
[W]e view the imposition of a just cause term by the WDA on the
parties negotiating a contract as meddling at the heart of the employeremployee relationship at a time when such interference is most harmful. Issues of hiring and firing are often central to [collective bargaining agreement] negotiations and the NLRA, as interpreted in
Machinists, intended to allow the parties to resolve
these matters with13
out the unsettling effect of state regulation. '
This distinction fails, however, because the MetropolitanLife principle allows state legislatures to mandate all substantive universal terms, 132
not just those remote from "the heart of the employer-employee relationship." 13 3 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit should not have preempted the
wrongful discharge statute's use by Barnes.
134
The Second Circuit, in Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hospital,
misapplied the Golden State ruling in another wrongful discharge case.
127.

Id.

128. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991).
129. Barnes, 942 F.2d at 691.
130. Id. at 693.
131. Id.
132. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 (1985); see also
discussion supra Part I.D.
133. The Barnescourt did not make clear why hiring and firing decisions are closer to "the
heart" of the relationship than, for example, wages, benefits, or working hours.
134. 844 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Registered Nurse Ralph Derrico worked under a union contract for
Sheehan Emergency Hospital until May 6, 1986. His collective bargaining agreement contained a termination provision "only for just cause."
The agreement expired on December 31, 1985. While it was in the process of being renegotiated, Derrico was fired. He then alleged wrongful
discharge in state court under an implied contract theory, basing his
claim partly on the premise that his collective bargaining agreement continued after the expiration date. 135 The hospital removed the case to federal court, and the Second Circuit ruled that a state law wrongful
discharge action based on an implied continuation of contract terms is an
impermissible extension of, and thus an interference with, the bargaining
plainly
process: "Expiration of a [collective bargaining agreement]
136
works a significant change in the parties' relationship."'
The Derricocourt misconstrued the first Golden State principle that
direct interference with the bargaining process is preempted. Golden
State prohibited the city's interference with the duration of time for bargaining, and established that durational interferences in general, even
when subtle, are preempted. 137 The Derricocourt contorted that principle to reach its extreme result. Derrico was incorrectly decided because,
like Barnes, it ignored the Metropolitan Life allowance for universally
applied state minimum labor standards. Ralph Derrico was simply pursuing a state court remedy for wrongful discharge that is available to all
employees regardless of whether they are unionized. 138 Thus, the Derrico
court, in finding the action preempted under Golden State, failed to recognize the allowance in Golden State for minimum employment
standards. 139
The most recent case to misapply Golden State and fail to recognize
the Metropolitan Life limitation is a First Circuit case, Associated Build14 °
ers & Contractors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.
The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) is the state
agency authorized by the Massachusetts Legislature to oversee the environmental cleanup of Boston Harbor. The MWRA had a history of labor problems and was under court order to finish on time. It hired
Kaiser Engineers to act as program manager and to advise the MWRA
on a labor-management policy that would maintain worksite harmony
and labor peace so that the project could be completed promptly. 14 ' Because of the court order and the geographic vulnerability of the project to
135.
terms as
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 23-24. Derrico also pointed to the parties' intent to be bound to the original
shown in their continuing negotiations. Id. at 24.
Id. at 29.
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 615 (1986).
See Derrico, 844 F.2d at 23.
See Golden State, 475 U.S. at 617.
935 F.2d 345 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992).
Id. at 347.
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picketing, 14 2 Kaiser received the MWRA's approval to negotiate directly
with the local building trades council.1 43 The result was a master labor
agreement containing the following provisions: The local unions were
granted exclusive representation rights over the employees of any subcontractors that successfully bid for a portion of the project; all employees were required to become union members within one week of their
employment; and fixed methods were prescribed for binding resolution of
all disputes. 144
The plaintiff, Associated Builders, is an organization comprised of
individual trade associations and construction contractors representing
nonunion employers. 145 Associated Builders brought suit in federal district court, seeking injunctive relief from enforcement of certain provisions of the master labor agreement that, by reason of Associated
Builders' nonaffiliation with the building trades council, "effectively
bar[red] them from seeking and obtaining any bids in this multi-billion
dollar, ten-year endeavor." 146
Associated Builders contended inter alia that the master labor agreement was preempted by the NLRA because it interfered with the labor
negotiations process. It alleged that the agreement illegally required employers to accept the terms of a collective bargaining agreement with a
union that had not been designated by the contractor's employees as
their bargaining agent. 147
The Massachusetts Water court mistakenly agreed with the employer and asserted that the case was "most heavily influenced by the
Supreme Court's holdings in the Golden State Transit Corp. cases, which
relied and expanded upon the Machinists doctrine.... [In Golden State,]
the Supreme Court reiterated with even greater firmness the NLRA's
subordination of state interests to the principle of unfettered collective
bargaining."'148 The First Circuit erroneously held that under Golden
State the master labor agreement was a significant intrusion into the bargaining process. The master agreement mandated, first, that a labor
agreement must be reached before a bid is awarded; second, with whom
that agreement must be made; and third, what its contents must include.
Based on its assessment of the master agreement, the court held, "For all
142. Access to one of the sites was by a single two-lane road passing through a crowded
city. Id. at 347 n.3.
143. These councils are regional affiliates of the American Federation of Labor, Congress
of Industrial Organizations.
144. Massachusetts Water, 935 F.2d at 348.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 352-53 (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608
(1986)).
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intents and purposes the state here eliminates the bargaining process
149
altogether."
This is an inappropriate application of the first principle established
by the Golden State holding. The creation of a master labor agreement
does not intrude upon the procedures of bargaining in the manner proscribed by Machinists and Golden State, but rather mandates substantive
terms that are universally applied to all who bid on the contract. 50 It is
true that these terms deal directly with the parties' relationship, for example, by mandating with whom the contract must be made,' 5 I but these
types of arrangements are an acceptable practice in the building trades
industry under § 8(e) and (f) of the NLRA: "It shall not be an unfair
labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to
make an agreement covering employees engaged ...

in the building and

construction industry with a labor organization .... ,152
The MWRA argued that since the NLRA explicitly allows a contractor in the private sector to legally bargain for such an arrangement, it
cannot be argued that the arrangement conflicts with, or is preempted by,
the NLRA. 1 53 Furthermore, since these arrangements are perfectly legal
in the private sector, there is no consistent policy justification for restricting their use by a public agency.'

54

The court was unmoved by this argument and asserted that Congress clearly differentiated between private and public employers when it
drafted the NLRA, and that since the MWRA, like other public employers, is not covered by § 8(e) and § 8(f), "its conduct cannot be compared" with a private employer. 55 The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari, however, and the First Circuit may be overturned.
C. State Interference with Individual Contracts That Should Be Preempted
The circuit courts do not err solely on the side of too much preemption. In some decisions, the courts fail to preempt governmental actions
when those actions should be prohibited. The first principle of Golden
State is that interference with the terms of an individual contract must be
preempted.
149. Id. at 353.
150. Id. at 348.
151. Id. at 353.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988).
153. Massachusetts Water, 935 F.2d at 358.
154. In addition, the MWRA asserted that it acted as an employer rather than a regulator
in these circumstances. As a market participant, it would be exempted from the preemption
doctrine. Id.; see Wisconsin Dep't. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475
U.S. 282 (1986); see also discussion supra Part I.B.
155. Massachusetts Water, 935 F.2d at 356.
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The Eighth Circuit, in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arkansas
Public Service Commission,-56 failed to understand this principle. Southwestern Bell negotiated a three-year contract, which included a wage
package, with the Communication Workers of America. Southwestern
Bell then applied to the Arkansas Public Service Commission (Commission) to increase the intrastate telephone rates by approximately sixtyone million dollars. 157 The Commission's role in these matters was confined to setting reasonable telephone rates. After reviewing Southwestern
Bell's request and reviewing the contract between Southwestern Bell and
the Communication Workers of America, the Commission refused to
grant the full increase. 158 Based on its assessment that the wage package
was unreasonable, the Commission adjusted Southwestern Bell's request
downward by approximately five million dollars.159
The Commission's failure to grant the full rate increase did not force
Southwestern Bell to pay employees less than their bargained wages over
the life of their contract, and in fact, the company conceded that it was
bound by the contract to pay full wages. 6 In the long run, however, the
company would undoubtedly be constrained by the Commission's estimation of appropriate wage levels, and would be forced to bargain
accordingly.
Although the court should have applied Golden State and ruled that
this rate adjustment was preempted, it ruled instead that in this circumstance there was no interference with the bargaining process or with
"either party's ability to use economic pressure."' 6' The Southwestern
Bell court tried to distinguish the facts in the case from Golden State by
noting that "the Commission has the authority under Arkansas law to
establish intrastate telephone rates."1 62 The court argued that since the
Commission "essentially becomes a third party at the bargaining table,
its power of63 the purse strings invariably affects the parties'
1
negotiations."'
The court failed to recognize that it is precisely the Commission's
assumption of the role of a third party at the bargaining table that is
preempted under Golden State. Under the Southwestern Bell court's
analysis, the Los Angeles City Council's franchise nonrenewal should not
have been preempted since the Council "has the authority under [local]
law'16 to decline to renew the franchise. As in Golden State, however,
156.
157,
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

824 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1988).
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the governmental action (the Commission's wage adjustment) consti165
tuted direct interference with a particular negotiating process.
In Livadas v. Aubry, 1 6 6 the Ninth Circuit similarly failed to preempt
a governmental act that should have been prohibited. Karen Livadas
worked for Safeway Stores in California. She was terminated on January
2, 1990 and did not receive her paycheck until three days later. 67 California Labor Code section 201 provides: "If an employer discharges an
employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due
and payable immediately."'' 6 Based on this ordinance, Ms. Livadas
69
claimed that Safeway owed her penalties for those three days.1
The Labor Commissioner, however, responded that the state labor
code prohibited him from adjudicating "any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any collective bargaining agreement" and
that interpretation of the agreement was necessary to ascertain Ms.
Livadas's daily wage rate.170 This ruling effectively barred unionized employees from receiving the benefits of California Labor Code section
201.171

Ms. Livadas filed suit in federal district court claiming that the
Commissioner's interpretation of the labor code was improper because it
was preempted under Machinists and Golden State.1 72 Livadas correctly
argued that the Commissioner impermissibly conditioned his adjudication of her dispute upon her abandoning her NLRA-protected right to
bargain collectively. 73
165. The Commission's role as protector of the public purse must be taken seriously.
However, by having the authority to review the results of bargaining and effectively veto already-bargained terms, the Commission's role conflicts with the Golden State principle of nonintervention in the bargaining process. This conflict is the inevitable result of Arkansas's
complex bargaining and rate-setting process. A preferable arrangement would be to require
the Commission or a designee to actually sit at the table from the commencement of bargaining
so that when the company achieved a contract with the union, both sides would know that the
deal could be funded. In fact the NLRA requires that an employer bargain "in good faith."
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). This means "[t]he employer is under a duty to invest its negotiators
with sufficient authority to carry on meaningful bargaining." THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,
supra note 3, at 299.
166. 943 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1991).
167. Id. at 1141.
168. CAL, LAB. CODE § 201 (West 1989).
169. Livadas, 943 F.2d at 1141-42.
170. Id. at 1144 (quoting letter from Labor Commissioner to Karen Livadas (Feb. 7,
1990)).
171. This effect is analogous to Montana's exclusion of union employees from the benefit
of the state's wrongful discharge statute. See Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689
(9th Cir. 1991); discussion supra Part IV.A.
172. Livadas, 943 F.2d at 1142.
173. Id. at 1145. The denial of a federally granted right under the NLRA is actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Id.
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The district court correctly applied the law of preemption and
granted Livadas's motion for summary judgment. 174 A Ninth Circuit
panel, however, misapplied the second Golden State principle of impermissible conditioning and overturned the district court order. The
panel's majority recognized that when a state act is conditioned on conforming labor relations behavior, that act is preempted. The court, however, mischaracterized the pertinent condition. According to the Ninth
Circuit, the Commissioner could not adjudicate this dispute under the
"condition" that he would have to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement. The court asserted that this condition was not only permissi175
ble, but required under federal law.
The Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the Golden State holding. It acknowledged that, under Golden State, conditioning the franchise renewal
on settlement of the labor dispute was "impermissible," but distinguished
the case before it by finding "a fundamental difference between this case
and Golden State. In Golden State, the city's condition itself was impermissible."1 7 6 This conclusion ignores the fact that the Commissioner's
decision regarding benefit adjudication was impermissibly conditioned on
relinquishment of the NLRA-protected right to belong to a union, and
77
should thus be preempted under Golden State.
The dissent in Livadas correctly characterized Karen Livadas's predicament as falling under the third Golden State principle, which prohibits discouraging the exercise of protected rights.178 Judge Kozinski
recognized that the California Labor Commissioner's interpretation of
state law would discourage workers from joining unions: "In so doing,
the Commissioner treated employees who are covered by a [collective
bargaining agreement] in a different-and less favorable-manner than
all other employees. This is clearly discrimination based on an exercise
174. Livadas v. Aubry, 749 F. Supp. 1526 (N.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 943 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir.
1991).
175. Livadas, 943 F.2d at 1146.
176. Id. at 1145. Through judicial manipulation, the Ninth Circuit ultimately transformed Livadas's federal preemption claim into an assertion that the California Labor Commissioner misapplied his own rule. The court therefore supposed that the claim was only
actionable under state law. Id. at 1146. The court did recognize that Ms. Livadas alleged a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because she alleged she was deprived of her federal
right to engage in collective bargaining. It denied, however, that the Commissioner's refusal to
adjudicate her claim constituted a deprivation of that right. Id. at 1146.
177. There was of course some difference between the claims of Livadas and Golden State,
although it was not the one on which the court focused. Whereas the Los Angeles City Council intruded into the bargaining process, which is expressly prohibited under Machinists, the
California Labor Commissioner's intervention was unrelated to bargaining per se, but rather
had an indirect effect on appellant's NLRA rights.
178. Livadas, 943 F.2d at 1147 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). It is noteworthy that California
Labor Code section 201 also falls under the MetropolitanLife allowance for universally applied
substantive terms. Cf discussion supra Part I.D.
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of protected federal rights." 179 In a footnote, Judge Kozinski highlighted
how the denial of this benefit serves to discourage the exercise of the
protected right to organize:
[T]he Commissioner's policy may have an effect on the collective bargaining process itself. It is not inconceivable that an employer could
point to this discrepancy as an argument against an effort to unionize:
"Look here, if you vote for the union, the first thing that happens is
that the state Labor Commissioner abandons you." In a closely
fought
180
election, this type of argument might make a difference.

In sum, these circuit court decisions have extended the Golden State
preemption doctrine too far. From an originally narrow holding that a
city council's franchise nonrenewal must not be conditioned on the settlement of a particular labor dispute, the boundaries of Golden State have
been improperly expanded. Some courts rely on Golden State to preempt
police nonintervention in labor disputes or to preempt beneficial wrongful discharge actions. 18' One court relies on Golden State to preempt
master labor agreements even though they are explicitly allowed under
the NLRA, 182 while other courts fail to properly apply Golden State to
preempt state actors that either enter the labor relations fray and adjust
84
wage agreements,1 83 or refuse to apply state wage benefits equally.1
Conclusion
The NLRA was designed "to be an emancipation for American labor."' 185 Congress passed the NLRA in order to grant workers basic
rights and protections. The Act has proved, however, to be an insufficient mechanism to achieve that end. Local regulations are needed to
buttress the goals of the NLRA. Ironically, the labor preemption doctrine, originally developed to protect federal legislation that safeguards
workers, has recently served to deny unionized employees the benefits of
much protective state legislation: "It would turn the policy that
animated the [NLRA] on its head to understand it to have penalized
workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on nonun179. Livadas, 943 F.2d at 1148 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1150 n.2 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
181.

See Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991); Derrico v.

Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1988).
182. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources
Auth., 935 F.2d 345 (Ist Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992).
183. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 824 F.2d 672 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1988).
184. See Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1991).
185. Kupferberg, supra note 2, at 701 (citing 79 CONG. REC. 9714 (1935) (remarks of Rep.
Truax), reprintedin 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935,
at 3185 (1949)).
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ion employers." 186 Indeed, there are several areas in which state laws
could provide significant benefits to workers: plant closure and corporate
takeover protections; 187 improved remedies for wrongful discharges; 188
and enhanced union access to employer premises 18 9
This Note argues that federal preemption of state involvement in
labor activity has gone far enough. Until the late 1980s, the Supreme
Court's preemption doctrine restricted direct state intervention in matters "protected... or prohibited by [the NLRA],"' 190 and labor relations
areas that Congress intended to be left to the "free play of economic
forces." 1 91 In 1986 the Court, in Golden State, extended the reach of the
preemption doctrine to include state acts that appear on their face to be
unrelated to collective bargaining.1 92 The Golden State decision should
mark the outer boundary of the labor preemption doctrine.
However, several circuits have misapplied Golden State and impermissibly extended its boundaries. The results of these misapplications
have been disastrous for workers and their unions, and have left state and
local officials unsure of what constitutes permissible conduct. The circuit
courts have distorted Golden State and generated what appear to be biased rather than principled decisions. Of the six circuit court decisions
that erroneously extend Golden State's boundaries, four preempt state
law protections for workers,1 93 and two fail to preempt employer abrogations of worker benefits.194
If workers are to be afforded any of the protections envisioned by
the drafters of the NLRA, then local and state authorities must have a
working blueprint that allows them to protect workers without fear of
additional preemptive rulings: Golden State must be applied in a clear
and principled fashion. This Note proposes a three-part conceptual
framework to eliminate the confusion surrounding Golden State. These
three principles establish that governmental conduct is preempted if it
186. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985).
187. Gottesman, supra note 4, at 418-21.
188. Id. at 394-95.
189. Id. at 411-12.
190. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959); see discussion
supra Part I.B.
191. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)); see
discussion supra Part I.C.
192. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 618 (1986); see
discussion supra Part II.
193. Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991); Associated Builders &
Contractors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 935 F.2d 345 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1935 (1992); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 926 F.2d 353 (4th
Cir. 1991); Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1988).
194. Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1991); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 824 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1988).
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constitutes direct intervention in the bargaining process; if it impermissibly "conditions" benefits on conforming labor relations behavior; or if it
discourages a party from exercising its NLRA-protected rights. Using
this framework, the lower courts will render decisions that are fairer,
more consistent, and more predictable.

